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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Edward Nicholas Bursiel appeals from the district court’s orders revoking 
his probation and denying his motion for credit for time served. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Forty-six-year-old Bursiel posted a personal ad on the “Casual 
Encounters” section of Craigslist in which he “claimed to be looking for sexual 
encounters with, ‘Any race, size, or age.  I don’t care.’”  (PSI, p.3.)  Posing as a 
14-year-old girl named “Nicki Scott,” a detective responded to the ad.  (Id.)  Over 
the next six days Bursiel engaged in online conversations with “Nicki” and told 
her “she was not too young,” and he had previously “been with a 14 year old” 
and “enjoyed teaching her things.”  (Id.)  He also “sent [“Nicki”] a picture of his 
erect penis and explained in detail how he would make her feel ‘good’ without it 
hurting.”  (Id.)  Bursiel and “Nicki” arranged to meet but, before Bursiel arrived at 
the designated meeting place, officers stopped him and arrested him for child 
enticement.  (Id.)  At the time of his arrest Bursiel had “two packs of lubricant and 
two condoms in the center console” of his vehicle.  (Id.) 
 The state charged Bursiel with one count of felony enticing a child through 
the use of the Internet and one count of misdemeanor disseminating material 
harmful to minors.  (R., pp.65-66.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bursiel pled 
guilty to the felony enticement charge and the state dismissed the misdemeanor.  
(7/14/14 Tr., p.4, L.3 – p.8, L.21.)  The district court initially imposed a unified 
sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.159-
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63.)  With the consent of both parties, and consistent with the terms of the plea 
agreement that were put on the record at Bursiel’s change of plea hearing, the 
district court later modified the underlying sentence to a unified sentence of 13 
years, with three years fixed.1  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.307-08, 310-23.) 
 On March 20, 2015, following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district 
court suspended the balance of Bursiel’s sentence and placed him on probation 
for a period of three years.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.37-56.)  Bursiel thereafter 
transferred his probation supervision to the state of Washington through an 
Interstate Compact agreement.  (Lim. R., vol. I, p.59.)  On June 26, 2015, 
Bursiel’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging Bursiel had violated 
his probation by having access to and using the internet, including by having 
password-protected files and email accounts and by “access[ing] the internet for 
sex”; having unauthorized contact with his minor son; engaging in casual sexual 
relationships with women he invited to his residence “for sex”; “hiding and lying
                                            
1 Bursiel timely appealed from the original judgment (see R., pp.167-70) and, for 
the first time on appeal, argued the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by 
recommending a sentence different than that contemplated by the agreement 
(See, generally, Brief of Appellant, filed July 20, 2015).  Pursuant to the state’s 
motion, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to 
make factual findings regarding the terms of the plea agreement.  (Lim. R., vol. 
II, p.283; Motion for Remand and Statement in Support Thereof, filed Dec. 30, 
2015.)  On remand, the district court found that the terms of the non-binding plea 
agreement required the prosecutor to recommend an underlying unified 
sentence of 13 years, with three years fixed, but that, at sentencing, the 
prosecutor unintentionally misstated the agreement as calling for a 
recommendation of 10 years, with five years fixed.  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.310-13.)  
Because the court “specifically adopted the State’s recommendations as to the 
underlying sentence without realizing that the State had misstated the plea 
agreement,” the court “correct[ed] its judgment to reflect” the sentence it found 
the state was obligated to recommend.  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.310-23.) 
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about information he had provided to” his supervising officer(s); failing to “seek 
and maintain gainful employment as directed”; and purchasing and consuming 
alcohol.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.59-63.)  The district court issued a bench warrant for 
the probation violations, and the warrant was served on Bursiel at the Benton 
County Jail in Kennewick, Washington, on July 2, 2015.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.92-
98.)  After Bursiel waived extradition and was arraigned on the probation 
violation allegations, the district court granted Bursiel’s request for a bond 
reduction on the condition that Bursiel “not leave the state of Idaho.”  (Lim. R., 
vol. I, pp.104-07, 118-20.)  Bursiel posted bond and was released from custody 
on August 7, 2015.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.122-26.) 
 On September 28, 2015, while the original probation violation allegations 
were still pending, Bursiel’s probation officer submitted another report of violation 
alleging that Bursiel had “left his known and approved residence” on or about 
August 27, 2015, and had since effectively “absconded from probation.”  (Lim. 
R., vol. I, pp.152-53.)  On October 27, 2015, Bursiel’s probation officer filed an 
addendum to September report of violation alleging that, since leaving his 
approved residence, Bursiel had committed two new crimes:  Failure to register 
as a sex offender in Kootenai County, and “Harassment (Threat to Kill) DV in 
Spokane County Washington.”  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.186-87; see also pp.151, 167-
82, 190-203.)     
 Following an evidentiary hearing on the allegations in all three reports of 
violation, the district court found Bursiel willfully violated his probation by 
accessing and using the internet, engaging in casual sexual relationships, 
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purchasing and consuming alcohol, and being found guilty of felony Criminal 
Mischief (amended from Harassment (Threat to Kill) DV) in Spokane County, 
Washington.  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.292-96, 298-301, 303-05.)  The court revoked 
Bursiel’s probation, executed his underlying sentence of 13 years, with three 
years fixed, and ordered that Bursiel “be given credit for all time served on [the 
child enticement] charge(s).”  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.326-28, 361-63.)  Bursiel filed a  
timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  
(Lim. R., vol. II, pp.364-65, 374-81, 382-86.) 
 On the same day the court entered its order revoking Bursiel’s probation, 
the state filed a “Motion Re Establishing Credit For Time Served.”  (Lim. R., vol. 
II, pp.331-32.)  Following a hearing on the motion, the district court entered an 
order giving Bursiel 353 days credit for time served.  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.393-96.) 
 Approximately three and a half months later, Bursiel filed a pro se motion 
seeking additional credit for time served.  (Aug., pp.1-6.)  Specifically, Bursiel 
requested credit toward his sentence for the time he spent incarcerated in the 
Benton County Jail before he was served with the bench warrant for the 
probation violations alleged in the June 26, 2015 report of violation.  (Aug., pp.3-
6.)  The district court denied the motion without a hearing, noting there had 
already been a hearing to establish Bursiel’s entitlement to credit for time served, 
and stating, “the issue of credit for time served has already been decided.”  
(Aug., pp.7-8.)  
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 Bursiel timely appealed both from the district court’s order revoking his 
probation and from its order denying his motion for credit for time served. 




Bursiel states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked 
probation and executed Mr. Bursiel’s sentence? 
 
2. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bursiel 68 days of 
credit for time served? 
 
(Revised Appellant’s Brief, p.7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Bursiel failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation after he demonstrated multiple times and in 
multiple ways (including by committing a new felony) that probation was 
neither serving its rehabilitative purpose nor consistent with the protection 
of society? 
 
2. Should this case be remanded to the district court for the limited purpose 
of considering the merits of Bursiel’s Rule 35 motion for additional credit 







Bursiel Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Revoking His Probation 
 
A. Introduction 
 After finding that Bursiel violated his probation on multiple occasions and 
in multiple ways, including by committing a new felony crime, the district court 
revoked Bursiel’s probation and executed his underlying sentence.  (Lim. R., vol. 
II, pp.292-96, 298-301, 303-05, 326-28, 361-63.)  Contrary to Bursiel’s assertions 
on appeal, a review of the record supports the district court’s determination that 
probation was neither serving its rehabilitative purpose nor consistent with the 
protection of society.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992).  “When a 
trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 




C. The Record Supports The District Court’s Decision To Revoke Bursiel’s 
 Probation Because The Probation Was Neither Consistent With The 
 Protection Of Society Nor Achieving Its Rehabilitative Purpose 
 
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-
2601(4).  The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the 
district court.  State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 
1987); State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992).  When 
deciding whether to revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether 
the probation [was] achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with 
the protection of society.”  Drennen, 122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701.  
Contrary to Bursiel’s assertions on appeal, application of these legal standards to 
the facts of this case shows the district court acted well within its discretion when 
it revoked Bursiel’s probation. 
Bursiel is not an appropriate candidate for probation.  The child 
enticement charge of which he was convicted in this case arose after Bursiel 
trolled the Internet for someone of “‘[a]ny race, size, or age’” with whom to have 
a sexual encounter.  (PSI, p.3.)  When someone Bursiel believed was a 14-year-
old girl responded to Bursiel’s ad, Bursiel engaged her in sexually explicit 
conversations, sent her a picture of his erect penis and arranged to meet her for 
sex.  (Id.)   
Upon initially sentencing Bursiel, the district court indicated it was “looking 
at all four” objectives of sentencing, including the protection of society.  (9/5/14 
Tr., p.22, Ls.9-15.)  The court was concerned by Bursiel’s criminal record, which 
included two prior felony convictions – including a conviction for manufacturing 
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and possessing an explosive device for which Bursiel spent 40 months in federal 
prison – as well as two misdemeanor convictions and other charges, such as 
assault and domestic violence, that indicated to the court that Bursiel had 
“issues” or “problems” with women.  (9/5/14 Tr., p.22, L.23 – p.23, L.4; PSI, pp.4-
6.)  “The most concerning thing to the Court,” however, was the psychosexual 
evaluation which indicated that Bursiel had “a problem and a lack of recognition 
and a need for treatment” that would best be accomplished in a prison setting.  
(9/5/14 Tr., p.22, Ls.16-19; see also Psychosexual Eval., pp.1, 20 (opining 
Bursiel “has a low amenability for treatment” and “would be a good candidate for 
a prison based program”).)  Despite Bursiel’s concerning criminal history and the 
psychosexual evaluator’s determination that Bursiel was not a candidate for 
community based treatment, the district court retained jurisdiction, thereby giving 
Bursiel the opportunity to prove himself worthy of probation.  (9/5/14 Tr., p.23, 
L.5 – p.24, L.5.) 
Although Bursiel successfully completed his period of retained jurisdiction 
(Lim. R., vol. I, pp.37-39), whatever rehabilitative strides he may have made in 
the program were extremely short-lived.  Less than two months after Bursiel was 
placed on probation and was allowed to transfer his supervision to the state of 
Washington, Bursiel’s roommate, Robert Hollomon, reported to Bursiel’s 
supervising officers that Bursiel had “accessed the internet for sex and also had 
email accounts,” “had unauthorized contact with his minor son” on two different 
occasions, “had invited women over [to] their residence for sex,” “had been 
hiding and lying about information he had provided to” his supervising officers, 
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and “had purchased/consumed alcohol.”  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.59-63.)  Mr. 
Hollomon provided the officers with Bursiel’s computer and smart phone, both of 
which were password-protected.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.60, 69.)  After giving 
deceptive responses during a polygraph test, Bursiel ultimately “admitted to 
internet use.”  (Lim. R., vol. I, p.60.) 
Bursiel was arrested on the probation violation allegations and, after 
waiving extradition, was transported back to Idaho.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.92-99, 
104-05.)  After an arraignment, the district court granted Bursiel’s request for 
bond reduction on the condition that, if he bonded out, Bursiel was “not [to] leave 
the state of Idaho.”  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.104-07, 118-20.)  Bursiel bonded out on 
August 7, 2015. (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.122-26.)  Within a month thereafter, Bursiel 
left his approved residence and returned to the state of Washington, where he 
again resided with Mr. Hollomon.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.152-53, 169-82, 190-203.)  
In October 2015, Mr. Hollomon learned there was an outstanding warrant for 
Bursiel’s arrest, and he asked Bursiel to move out.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.170, 173-
74.)  Bursiel threatened to kill Mr. Hollomon if Mr. Hollomon turned him in, and he 
claimed that, for $500, he could hire someone to come through town and “attack 
Hollomon at the railroad tracks.”  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.170, 173-74.)  Mr. Hollomon 
was afraid for his life and called the police.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.170, 173-74.)  
When the police arrived at the residence, Bursiel was holed up in a travel trailer 
that was parked in the driveway and only came out after a SWAT team deployed 
two rounds of a “chemical agent” into the trailer.  (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.171, 174-78.)  
Bursiel was initially charged with “Harassment (Threat to Kill) DV” for having 
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threatened Mr. Hollomon’s life (Lim. R., vol. I, pp.179-81), but he was ultimately 
found guilty of felony criminal mischief (2/2/16 Tr., p.52, L.2 – p.54, L.1; Lim. R., 
vol. II, p.305).   
In deciding to revoke Bursiel’s probation, the district court specifically 
recognized that its first priority was “the protection of society.”  (3/11/16 Tr., p.14, 
Ls.11-14.)  The court noted that Bursiel had been given “a number of chances” 
to succeed on probation but, on each occasion, he “broke[] the trust of the Court 
and of the Department of Probation” by failing to abide by the conditions of his 
probation, including by committing new crimes.  (3/11/16 Tr., p.11, L.14 – p.12, 
L.10, p.14, Ls.11-13.)  The court reiterated Bursiel’s criminal history and the 
psychosexual evaluator’s findings, even before sentencing, that “Bursiel has 
demonstrated a pattern of poor decisions that has contributed to his criminal 
behavior” and “has a low amenability for treatment.”  (3/11/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-22, 
p.13, Ls.6-12 (internal quotations omitted).)  Considering that information, 
together with the number and nature of Bursiel’s probation violations, the district 
court found in an exercise of discretion that revoking Bursiel’s probation and 
executing his sentence was necessary both to protect society and to further 
Bursiel’s rehabilitation.  (3/11/16 Tr., p.13, L.17 – p.14, L.21.) 
On appeal, Bursiel cites his military service, employment history, and 
purported remorse as factors he claims the court failed to properly consider 
when it revoked his probation.  (Revised Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)  All of this 
information was before the court and considered both at the time of sentencing 
and at the disposition hearing.  (See 9/5/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17 (district court 
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indicated it had reviewed the presentence report and psychosexual evaluation); 
3/11/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.17-20 (court rendering decision “in light of the information 
that has been provided in the presentence investigation report, the psychosexual 
evaluation, [Bursiel’s] past history, and [his] commission of crimes”).)  That 
Bursiel disagrees with how the district court weighed the evidence and balanced 
the objectives of sentencing does not show an abuse of discretion.  See State v. 
Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 879, 253 P.3d 310, 316 (2011) (“In this case, Windom 
essentially asks this Court to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court 
and reach a different conclusion ….  However, our role is not to reweigh the 
evidence considered by the district court; our role is to determine whether 
reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district court.”).  
Bursiel also largely ignores the facts that support the court’s decision to revoke 
his probation – i.e., the number and nature of Bursiel’s probation violations – 
including the commission of new crimes, his complete disregard for the terms of 
probation and the orders of the court, and his failure to demonstrate any 
rehabilitative progress while in the community.  Given any reasonable view of the 
facts, Bursiel has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation. 
 
II. 
This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court For Consideration Of The 
Merits Of Bursiel’s Rule 35 Motion For Additional Credit For Time Served 
 
 On the same day the court entered its order revoking Bursiel’s probation, 
the state filed a “Motion Re Establishing Credit For Time Served.”  (Lim. R., vol. 
II, pp.331-332.)  The state asserted that, as of the date of the disposition 
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hearing, Bursiel “had accrued a total of 353 days credit for time served,” which 
calculation included, inter alia, the time Bursiel spent in custody between July 8, 
2015 – the date the state asserted Bursiel was arrested on the bench warrant 
issued in connection with his first alleged probation violations2 – and August 7, 
2015 – the date he posted bond and was released from custody.  (Lim. R., vol. II, 
pp.331-32.)  Following a hearing on the motion, the district court entered an 
order giving Bursiel 353 days credit for time served.  (Lim. R., vol. II, pp.393-96.) 
 Approximately three and a half months later, Bursiel filed a pro se motion 
seeking additional credit for time served.  (Aug., pp.1-6.)  Specifically, Bursiel 
requested credit toward his sentence for the time he spent incarcerated in the 
Benton County Jail before he was served with the bench warrant for the 
probation violations alleged in the June 26, 2015 report of violation.  (Aug., pp.3-
4.)  In an affidavit filed in support of the motion, Bursiel represented that he was 
incarcerated in the Benton County Jail from May 1, 2015, until July 16, 2015, and 
that his incarceration was attributable solely to the probation violations he was 
alleged to have committed in this case.  (Aug., pp.3-4.)  He also attached to his 
motion a “Jail Time Certification” from the Benton County Sheriff’s Office 
showing that he was in fact incarcerated in the Benton County Jail from May 1, 
2015, until July 16, 2015.  (Aug. p.6.)   The district court denied the motion 
without a hearing, stating as the bases for its ruling that there had already been a
                                            
2 It appears from the record that the warrant was actually served on July 2, 2015.  
(See Lim. R., vol. I, pp.92-98.) 
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hearing to establish Bursiel’s entitlement to credit for time served, and that “the 
issue of credit for time served has already been decided.”  (Aug., pp.7-8.) 
 On appeal, Bursiel argues the district court erred by denying his pro se 
motion for additional credit for time served because the factual assertions Bursiel 
made in the motion and accompanying affidavit “are supported by the record” 
and demonstrate that he is entitled under I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-227 to credit 
for the time he served in custody on the probation violation allegations in this 
case, even before the bench warrant issued in connection with those allegations 
was served.  (Revised Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.)  The state does not concede 
that Bursiel is actually entitled to any of the credit he seeks.  However, the state 
does acknowledge that Bursiel is entitled, as a matter of law, to credit for every 
day he served in custody following an arrest on the probation violations in this 
case, if such arrest was made pursuant to I.C. § 20-227.  See I.C. § 19-2603 
(“The defendant shall receive credit for time served from the date of service of a 
bench warrant issued by the court after a finding of probable cause to believe the 
defendant has violated a condition of probation, [or] for any time served following 
an arrest of the defendant pursuant to section 20-227 ….”).  The state also 
acknowledges that, in State v. Moore, 156 Idaho 17, 21, 319 P.3d 501, 505 (Ct. 
App. 2014), the Court of Appeals expressly held that “a district court may only 
give credit for the correct amount of time actually served by the defendant” and 
that “the district court does not have discretion to award credit for time served 
that is either more or less than that.”  Moreover, “[t]he district court is not bound 
to accept either party’s calculations of the appropriate credit for time served in a 
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Rule 35(c) motion. Instead, it is the district court’s duty to determine the accurate 
credit for time served as reflected by the record and award that time 
accordingly.”  Id. 
 In light of Moore and the statutes that govern a defendant’s entitlement to 
credit for time served, the state concedes the district court erred by not 
considering the merits of Bursiel’s Rule 35 motion seeking additional credit for 
time served.  Although the state does not concede Bursiel is actually entitled to 
more credit than has already been awarded, the state submits this case should 
be remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of considering and ruling 




 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order revoking Bursiel’s probation and that the case be remanded to the district 
court for consideration of the merits of Bursiel’s Rule 35 motion for credit for time 
served. 
 DATED this 10th day of November, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Lori A. Fleming______ 
 LORI A. FLEMING 
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